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In recent decades, much has been said about the different behavioral procedures designed 
to measure awareness (or, if one prefers, consciousness – these two terms being employed 
for the most part interchangeably). Such measures are traditionally divided into two 
categories: subjective and objective (Timmermans and Cleeremans 2015). Despite 
significant problems of both a methodological and a theoretical nature, and growing 
criticism or even pessimism about the whole project (Michel 2019; Irvine 2013, 2019; 
Phillips 2016; Klein and Hohwy 2015; Persuh 2018), the debate over measures of 
consciousness is far from over. Modified or novel procedures are still being proposed (see, 
e.g., Maniscalco and Lau 2012, 2014; Wierzchoń et al 2019), while existing ones are 
becoming ever more sophisticated and being applied to an ever greater variety of cases. 
Although the present article mentions some of the major and well known problems 
associated with behavioral measures of consciousness (e.g. exhaustiveness, exclusiveness, 
biased processing, and validity), its main concern is a more modest one, centering on two 
rather basic issues: namely, the distinction between subjective and objective measures of 
awareness, and the directedness of such measures. We can find at least two different ways 
of understanding the above distinction in play in the literature, and by developing two 
opposing objections examples, the present article sets out to show that the element of 
ambiguity produced by this state of affairs engenders varying objections and/or 
misinterpretations. On the other hand, claims about a given measure exhibiting a more or 
less (or a maximally) direct character (Sandberg et al 2010; Persaud et al. 2007) coexist 
with statements casting doubt on such directness (Wierzchoń et al. 2014) or even explicitly 
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declaring all measures of this sort to be indirect (Seth 2008a, 2008b; Pasquali et al. 2010; 
Timmermans and Cleeremans 2015). Since there exists only one proper definition of 
directness for a given measure in the literature (namely, that proposed in Reingold and 
Merikle 1988), and this does not seem to have been applied unambiguously in the current 
discussion, the questions of what we really mean when we say of some measure that it is 
direct, and whether its directness should be regarded as a desirable feature, seem pertinent. 
Consequently, the primary aim of the article is to achieve some real clarity about issues 
that have previously only seemed straightforward – or, at least, to render them sufficiently 
well-defined to furnish answers to two rudimentary questions: what makes a given 
behavioral measure subjective, and what makes it direct (or at least more or less direct). At 
the very least, the hope is that in the light of this discussion, it will be clear that anyone 
basically inclined to believe that subjective measures are subjective in virtue of 
exemplifying a direct and first-person-based approach, while objective ones correspond to 
what is disclosed in an indirect and third-person-based way, has at best an overly simplistic 
overall grasp of the issues involved. 
 
 
2. The Subjective versus Objective Distinction 
This part starts out with a brief description of the most common subjective and objective 
measuring procedures, followed by a presentation of two opposing objections to that very 
distinction itself. In the closing subsection, two possible ways of understanding that 
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distinction are described – these being, respectively, a methodological and a semantic one. 




2.1 Subjective and Objective Measures 
Let us begin by mentioning, from amongst the subjective measures most commonly 
discussed in this ongoing debate, the following three procedures (cf. Timmermans and 
Cleeremans 2015): Perceptual-Awareness Scale (PAS) (Ramsøy and Overgaard 2004), 
Confidence Ratings (CR) (Dienes et al. 1995), and Post-Decision Wagering (PDW) 
(Persaud et al. 2007).  
PAS is based on an explicitly introspective report as regards quality of experience. 
One of the possible scenarios for the procedure (based on Wierzchoń et al 2014) runs as 
follows: after a fixation cross is flashed up on a laptop monitor, a target stimulus is 
presented to the participant over near-threshold time durations (e.g. between 16 and 
192ms), followed by a 200ms presentation of a mask. The target stimulus may be either 
quite simple (e.g. geometrical shapes, numbers, letters) or a more complex image (e.g. 
male or female faces), while the mask will be an unspecified image (e.g. various 
meaningless patterns). Immediately after the presentation of the stimulus and the mask, the 
participant is asked to identify the object (e.g. as male or female) and, after that, to rate the 
quality of his or her visual experience (e.g. using a scale structured into four consecutive 
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grades: clear experience, almost clear experience, vague experience, and no experience). 
In most cases, reports are given by pressing the relevant buttons on the laptop keyboard: 
for example, in the context of the identification task, pressing ‘right arrow’ may 
correspond to ‘female face’ and ‘left arrow’ to ‘male face’, whilst when it comes to 
quality-related ratings pressing number ‘1’ may correspond to ‘clear experience’, ‘2’ to 
‘almost clear’, and so on.  
Turning to the CR procedure, we may note that this can be performed under an 
identical scenario to that for PAS as described above (Wierzchoń et al. 2014, just cited). 
However, the most important difference is that after completing an identification task, a 
participant is asked to rate their confidence in their own (identification-related) 
performance by choosing confidence levels (on a scale running between total guessing and 
actually knowing (outlined in Wierzchoń et al 2014) in four consecutive steps, these being 
guessing, not confident, quite confident, and very confident). Although CRs are based on 
one’s judgement of one’s own performance, and aim to avoid explicit introspection, they 
may implicitly involve a relation to the quality of one’s own experience.   
Meanwhile, PDW has, in turn, a lot in common with the procedure for CR, the 
major difference being that, after completion of the identification task, instead of deciding 
about confidence the participant is asked to wager on how they will eventually assess their 
own performance with a specified amount of money (e.g. by opting for a 20, 40, 60 or 80 
PLN stake). The initial aim of the procedure was to encourage participants – by appealing 
to their desire to gamble and maximize earnings – to give answers in cases where 
confidence was too low, and consequently to increase the sensitivity and exhaustiveness of 
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the measure (especially for near-conscious perceptions). However, the results here have 
proved to be of debatable validity (due to the influence of the phenomenon of risk 
aversion). Most importantly, for the purposes of this article, the initial claim that PDW is a 
direct and yet also an objective measure of awareness has been subjected to powerful 
criticism (Seth 2008a, 2008b).  
Currently, the most commonly encountered examples of so called objective 
measures are furnished by different kinds of forced-choice discrimination or identification 
tasks. Again, the procedure may be performed under an identical scenario to that of the 
aforementioned cases: coming after the fixation cross, a given target stimulus is presented 
to a participant over some near-threshold duration, followed by a mask and a forced-choice 
identification task (e.g. choosing between alternative options: male or female). Based on 
the objective number of correct and incorrect identifications, the measure may be 
calibrated to boundary conditions (e.g. via varied presentation times), such that 
performance is just above the level of chance. (Such boundaries with respect to objective 
sensitivity determine the parameter known as d’, as defined in Signal Detection Theory, a 
theoretical foundation for objective measures (Macmillan and Creelman 1991; Phillips 
2016).) The original assumption behind objective measures of awareness is the so called 
‘Worldly Discrimination Theory’ (Gaillard et al. 2006; Fu et al. 2008), according to which, 
if a person is able to discriminate between two stimuli (presented within sensitivity 
thresholds), they are aware of those stimuli. So the objective approach implies that 
sensitivity to certain stimuli (as shown in the relevant behavior) correlates with awareness 
of those stimuli (or even may involve the very same process), which is quite debatable. 
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(These issues have been described more extensively elsewhere (see Timmermans and 
Cleeremans 2015).) 
It is worth noting that subjective and objective procedures currently coexist 
fruitfully in practice, as they make inspecting and correlating their results straightforward. 
Most often, the above-chance (objective) sensitivity obtained in the discrimination task (in 
the form of a sufficient number of correct identifications) is compared to some different 
subjective measures. Meanwhile, the most interesting cases are those that show a 
dissociation between subjective and objective measures: the so called guessing criterion, 
where a participant reports ‘guessing’ or ‘no experience’ even while exhibiting a high level 
of accuracy in respect of the relevant discrimination task (potentially implying access to 
certain unconscious yet relevant information), and the zero-correlation criterion, where 
confidence or awareness ratings do not relate to accuracy (potentially implying exposure to 
certain conscious yet non-relevant or biased information) (Dienes et al. 1995; Dienes 
2008). A similar idea of applying signal-detection theory to subjective awareness ratings is 
explored in the so called meta-d’ approach. (Just very roughly, as d’ is obtained by 
quantifying correct and incorrect discriminations, the meta-d’ parameter is obtained by 
quantifying correct and incorrect discriminations of one’s own correctness or incorrectness 






2.2 Behavioral and Phenomenological Objections 
With reference to subjective measures, Persuh (2018) has claimed in a recent article that 
“… [the] “subjective” character of [such] measures is illusory and … subjective measures, 
like objective measures, estimate only performance on a discrimination task.” He relates 
this declaration explicitly to introspective report procedures, such as PAS, and also argues 
that “[n]o matter how the question is posed [for the hypothetical participant, John – 
author’s note], language does not give John any special powers to make his report more 
subjective.” Persuh justifies this from the perspective of a very broadly specified 
behavioral assumption to the effect that there is no relationship between someone’s report 
about their own experience and their actual experience other than certain behavioral 
correlations, because “an organism can only report correlations and we can only measure 
task performance” and, “[b]y the same token, a parrot can learn a correlation between its 
visual experience and some arbitrary motor output.”  
If Persuh’s position on this amounts to a ‘behavioral stance’, then we might easily 
move in the opposite direction and argue, from what might be said to be a 
‘phenomenological stance’, that in the case of objective measures their objective character 
is illusory, because objective measures, like subjective ones, estimate only with reference 
to a (subjective) response criterion – and, moreover, that no matter how the question is 
posed, the language employed does not itself have any special power to make the answer 
more objective. In fact, such considerations have already been highlighted by several 
researchers, who have pointed out that even in the context of forced-choice decisions or 
identification tasks, a participant must to a certain extent use their own response criteria in 
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order to make up their mind and arrive at an answer (Timmermans and Cleeremans 2015; 
Phillips 2016). The nature of such a decision process – whether it amounts to an 
unconscious or pre-conscious gathering of evidence or build-up in confidence – remains a 
matter for investigation. 
Both behavioral and phenomenological objections to the subjective versus objective 
distinction as it figured in the context just outlined are, in this author’s view, misleading. 
Indeed, it will be argued below that they rest on a misunderstanding of the very 
foundations of what that distinction amounts to. Yet, at the same time, it must be admitted 
that such a line of argumentation points in the direction of some things that hold true for 
the measures in question. First, it indicates that both subjective and objective measures are 
in fact behavioral, because they actually measure (directly) specific behaviors (e.g. button-
pressing on a laptop keyboard, or verbal activity), and second, it reveals that both 
measuring procedures do actually require decisions on the part of participants, these being 
based on their processing/perception of stimuli presented during the experiment. These 
simple facts not only make the above objections potentially plausible, but also make the 
measures vulnerable to other well-known problems. The latter are exemplified in such 
questions as whether the behavior measured actually correlates with any form of 
consciousness, and whether, if so, it correlates only with consciousness (and not, for 
example, with certain unconsciously learned response strategies), as well as whether the 
(subjective) response criteria are free of bias – or, at least, less susceptible to being biased, 
and so on (Phillips 2016). In general, questions about the validity, exhaustiveness, and 
exclusiveness of the measures in question (Timmermans and Cleeremans 2015) are very 
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hard to answer unambiguously, and quite apart from all the methodological issues 
involved, this will anyway be the case for a comparatively more fundamental reason: 
namely, that the very notion of consciousness is itself far from unambiguous. (The science 
of consciousness has not fixed any definite threshold or thresholds, and neither has it 
managed to construct any conception or theory of consciousness that has gained universal 
acceptance; thus, we remain uncertain as to which states should be counted as conscious 
and which as unconscious or less conscious. Ultimately, then, all one can do is seek to 
relate the above questions to some sort of operational definition of consciousness (cf. 
Jonkisz 2012, 2015).)  
 
 
2.3 The Methodological Distinction 
The present author’s position is that both of the above lines of argumentation (i.e. the 
behavioral and phenomenological objections) misconstrue the distinction between 
subjective and objective measures, and that they do so by overestimating both the character 
of the task involved in the procedure and the language used by participants there. It is not 
the difference in the tasks involved – between ratings of experience on the one hand and 
delivering discriminative answers based on sensory content on the other – that is key to 
that distinction. Moreover, it is also not the difference in the language used when 
describing qualitative features of experience on the one hand and objective features of the 
stimulus on the other. (Regarding linguistic influences on such measures, see also the work 
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of Lyyra (2019).) At the same time, what we may note is that the (subjective/objective) 
character of the criterion used as an experimental threshold for consciousness is being 
underestimated or even totally neglected here, whereas it will be argued below that this 
should in fact count as crucial where this distinction is concerned. 
The subjectivity of putatively subjective measures is unequivocally justified by the 
very criteria according to which some given behavior (e.g. reporting on the quality of one’s 
own experience or on one’s own performance via button-pressing) is correlated with 
conscious or unconscious stimulus-processing (in the case of a binary measure), or with 
certain intermediate grades of consciousness (in the case of graded and continuous 
measuring scales). The criteria are subjective simply because all that counts here is the 
participant’s biased decision about whether their visual experience has been clear, almost 
clear, vague or nil (in the PAS procedure), as revealed in the corresponding behavior. (The 
same goes for subjective performance judgements within the CR and PDW procedures, 
where subjectively biased decisions about confidence or wager stake are all that counts). 
Similarly, the criteria employed in what are claimed to be objective measures 
qualify as objective inasmuch as what counts there is just sheer performance or accuracy in 
respect of some discriminatory task: i.e. the (objective) proportion of valid discernments to 
false alarms. Of course, the objection coming out of the ‘phenomenological stance’ 
(described above) might be that in this case even sheer performance is based on a 
subjectively-biased response criterion (formed with reference to the perception of the 
stimulus by some participant/subject or other). The answer to this, though, is 
straightforward: one grants that that is true, but in objective measures both the sensitivity 
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levels (with d’>0) and the personal (biased) response criteria (with criterion C) are 
controlled (in that no matter what the response criteria happen to be, the performance 
should anyway be above the level of chance). Therefore, what the objective procedure 
considers when deciding whether or not the perception of the stimulus was conscious is 
whether or not a participant was sensitive to the stimulus and whether or not he or she 
performed accurately. 
Just as in the case of objective measures the phenomenological objection can be 
refuted, so in the case of subjective measures the behavioral objection can be so. 
According to the latter, the subjective character of subjective measures is illusory, as (like 
objective measures) they only estimate performance in certain discriminatory or forced-
choice tasks presented in behavior. The answer, once again, is quite simple: one grants this, 
but the behavior presented in subjective measures (such as PAS, CR or PDW) is based on 
personal, biased criteria (e.g. a choice between ‘clear experience’ and ‘no experience,’ or 
between ‘guessing’ and ‘confident’), which are not controlled. Therefore, it may also be 
said that whereas in subjective measures a subjective threshold is being utilized, in 
objective measures it is an objective threshold (see Timmermans and Cleeremans 2015). 
The thresholds in question were already defined by Cheesman and Merkile (1984), when 
they wrote that “[a] subjective threshold may be defined as the detection level at which 
subjects claim not to be able to discriminate perceptual information at better than a chance 
level, whereas an objective threshold is the detection level at which perceptual information 
is actually discriminated at a chance level.”  
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Consequently, what makes some measure subjective or objective is not the specific 
task, with some special form of reporting or language-use being involved alongside this (as 
the above lines of argumentations seem to suppose). Rather, it is the criterion or threshold 
according to which some given behavior is correlated with conscious, almost conscious, 
barely conscious or unconscious stimulus processing (depending on the procedure used). 
The subjectivity or objectivity of the criterion, or the threshold for consciousness 
implemented, cannot be questioned in the ways outlined above, and so may serve as an 
unambiguous characterization of the measures in question. Thus: 
 Measures will be objective when they utilize an objective threshold (a bias-free 
criterion for consciousness). 
 Measures will be subjective when they utilize a subjective threshold (a biased 
criterion for consciousness). 
Surprisingly, such a methodological or pragmatic formulation of the distinction is not 
commonly encountered in the current debate – a fact which is no doubt bound up with the 
existence of other more frequently adopted ones (see below).  
 
 
2.4 The Semantic Distinction 
Another way of defining the distinction between subjective and objective measures goes in 
the direction of differentiating between so called ‘outer states’ (stimulus features, worldly 
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discriminations, etc.) and ‘inner states’ (mental, experiential, perceptual). Here are a few 
examples: 
An objective measure uses the ability of a person to discriminate states of the 
world… Subjective measures ask people to report the mental state they are in… 
(Dienes 2008) 
Subjective measures leverage introspective capabilities….. Objective measures do 
not require introspection and instead use some other behavior, for example forced-
choice decision accuracy… (Seth 2008b) 
Objective methods typically involve asking people to choose between different 
carefully constructed alternatives (i.e. as in a two-alternative forced-choice task) 
rather than describing what they saw or felt [i.e. what subjective methods do – 
author’s note]. (Timmermans and Cleeremans 2015) 
In principle, such characterizations specify what the report required or requested in 
connection with some task outlined in relation to a given measure refers to (i.e. whether it 
should be directed towards inner or outer states). Hence, the distinction, when constructed 
along such lines, may be said to possess a semantic character, taking the following form:  
 Measures are objective when they ask one to discriminate (and report) states of the 
world (e.g. features of the stimulus presented). 
 Measures are subjective when they ask participants to introspect (and report) their 
perceptual states (e.g. experiential features). 
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Intuitively, the distinction seems fine. However, for at least two reasons, it is not as 
efficacious as the methodological one presented earlier. First, this is because it is very 
difficult to be sure about whether a participant is introspectively reporting inner states or, 
instead, discriminating outer states without introspection: we cannot even be certain 
whether these two processes are going on in ways that are separate or intermixed. (In this 
context, see also the so-called transparency thesis, according to which isolated awareness 
of features of one’s own experience is virtually impossible (e.g. Tye 2014).) Admittedly, it 
has recently been proposed that the semantics of the perceptual-awareness scale should be 
examined, and that only ‘experiential terms’ such as clarity or intensity should figure in the 
task description (Lyyra 2019). However, even with such a refined PAS, doubts may well 
remain as to whether taking due care over the semantics will suffice to ensure adequate 
receptivity to the participant’s phenomenology. Second, it is because when all subjective 
measures are taken into account, such a definition better fits the procedures involved when 
using a perceptual-awareness scale, while being problematic in relation to both confidence 
ratings and post-decision wagering. By asking people to judge their own performance, 
either in terms of their own confidence in the latter or via their willingness to wager on it, 
such measures explicitly ask for neither the stimulus features nor the inner perceptual 
states to be reported – yet, implicitly, both are most likely involved. (Even so, opinions are 
divided on this: see, e.g., Seth (2008a, 2008b), who includes PDW in objective measures, 
and Timmermans and Cleeremans (2015), who treat both measures as subjective). In fact, 
both CR and PDW may implicitly involve metacognitive judgements about both the 
identification process and one’s own performance within it. (See also the next part of this 
16 
 
article, below.) In the present context, it would be more accurate to refer to them as 
subjective performance measures, and to PAS and similar procedures as subjective 
experience measures.  
There is also a more fundamental reason for the semantic distinction’s being 
problematic. Whereas the criterion or threshold applied in the context of a given measure 
can be unambiguously identified as subjective or objective (as shown in the previous 
section), the task’s reference to inner or outer states can in both cases be interpreted in 
either direction. That is because the features of the presented stimulus alone can be both 
objective (e.g. location and shape of the object, its category or name) and, at least partly, 
subjective (e.g. color, appearance in the sense of seeming a certain way) – something that 
of course pertains to the classical (Lockean) distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities. Similarly, features of inner perceptual states can also be analyzed from both an 
objective and a subjective angle: the referential (or intentional) object of a given perceptual 
state (e.g. a human face or a certain geometrical shape flashed up on a screen) is more or 
less objective, whereas the qualitative features of perceptions are subjective (e.g. intensity 
or clarity of the image involved). Such comments must suffice here, as a fuller analysis of 
this issue would require one to delve into different philosophical theories of perception – 






3. Directness as a Feature of Awareness Measures 
Some researchers claim that conscious experience lends itself to being gauged directly via 
a specifically designed measure (see Persaud et al. 2007), whilst others prefer to assert that 
a certain measure is just more direct than others – for example, that PAS will measure 
consciousness more directly than other subjective measures (Sandberg et al. 2010). At the 
same time, there are researchers who insist that due to the ontologically subjective nature 
of conscious experience, all measures of consciousness must be indirect (e.g. Seth 2008a, 
2008b; Timmermans and Cleeremans 2015). Taking these discrepancies seriously, it seems 
reasonable to inquire into what it is that makes a given measure of consciousness direct, or 
at least more or less direct. 
The issue does not seem as straightforward as the distinction between subjective 
and objective measures. Nevertheless, just as subjective measures, compared to objective 
ones, are quite often considered ‘better’ (at least in terms of their validity; see 
Timmermans and Cleeremans 2015), so also direct measures emerge as preferable to 
indirect ones (see, e.g., Persaud et al. 2007, or Sandberg et al. 2010). The definition of 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ measures was actually formulated by Reingold and Merikle (1988) 
with the aim of targeting unconscious perception using objective measures of performance. 
However, their definition (analyzed separately below) does not automatically apply to 
subjective measures, and also does not seem to be ‘directly’ employed in the current 
discussion. As will be shown, directness of measures is currently only construed rather 
ambiguously, with multiple senses and divergent philosophical assumptions. 
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This next part of this article will start out with a brief analysis of some 
metaphysical assumptions about consciousness that have arisen either explicitly or 
implicitly in the literature. This will then be followed by an exploration of Reingold and 
Merikle’s definition of ‘direct measure’, and an analysis of some other possible senses in 
which the term ‘directness’ may be construed.  
 
 
3.1 Metaphysical Directness 
The subjective character of conscious experience, in the sense of its privacy or first-person-
based accessibility, is undeniable; moreover, it is commonly held to be the aspect that 
differentiates consciousness from other phenomena known to science. As a basis for such 
theoretical concepts as phenomenal consciousness (Block 1995) and the hard problem of 
consciousness (Chalmers 1995, 1996), the subjectivity of experience has ultimately pushed 
many contemporary philosophers of mind in the direction of endorsing some otherwise 
quite unpopular theoretical and/or metaphysical outcomes, such as dualism or 
panpsychism, often combined with antireductionism or mysterianism (Block 1995; Jackson 
1982; Chalmers 1995, 1996; Searle 2000; McGinn 1989). It seems that the issue also arises 
in discussions about the directness of awareness measures, where some prominent 




Because conscious content is ontologically subjective, it is a simple fact of the 
matter that no such direct behavioral measures exist… (Seth 2008a) 
It would be pushing at an open door to state that the study of consciousness is 
challenging because it attempts to develop an epistemically objective approach to a 
phenomenon that is ontologically subjective… (Timmermans and Cleeremans 
2015)  
If, as Seth claims, behavioral measures cannot be direct because the contents of 
consciousness are ontologically subjective, what kind of directness is being invoked here? 
He is quite scrupulous on this point, and states that a “‘direct measure’ is one that 
transparently reflects its target property, as a ruler directly measures length” (Seth 2008b). 
If this is supposed to mean that a direct measure of consciousness would measure 
consciousness as if the subjectivity barrier had disappeared, with full access to conscious 
contents ‘from the outside’ as if ‘from the inside’, then it has to be admitted that such an 
idealized scenario is of course impossible, and Seth is right. Yet such a barrier-crossing, 
metaphysical understanding of directness may be also accused of fallaciousness. Such an 
accusation would be very similar to those levelled against the majority of idealistic 
advocates of the so called knowledge argument (formulated in many versions by, e.g., 
Broad, Feigl, Nagel and Jackson) or explanatory gap postulate (coined by Levine), 
insisting that science should provide direct knowledge of other subjects’ experiences. The 
belief that science has only resolved the hard problem of consciousness when it permits us 
to know (directly) what it is like to see in color, or ‘what it is like to be a bat’ (or any other 
being different from ourselves), is fallacious when construed literally, in that it involves, at 
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the very least, a category error: scientific (objective) explanations just are categorically 
different from (subjective) conscious experiences (Pigliucci 2013; Jonkisz 2016). And if 
indeed such a formulation of the hard problem “does not require a solution, but rather, a 
cure” (Edelman et al. 2011, p. 5), then the same goes for metaphysically construed 
directness. Measures just are located in a different category from conscious contents, so 
claiming that “the fact that consciousness is ontologically subjective precludes direct 
behavioral access to conscious content” (Seth 2008b) is either tautological or (indirectly) 
fallacious. In this context, one may even reasonably ask whether there is anything at all 
arising within psychology or the philosophy of mind that could be directly measured in 
behavior.  
As an aside, it is perhaps worth adding that when it comes to discussing measures 
of consciousness, a more conservative approach to the entertaining of metaphysical 
assumptions about consciousness would seem to be the safer option. Claims about the 
subjective ontology of consciousness, adopted from Searle (2000) and other philosophers, 
are very strong, and straightforwardly entail all the difficult metaphysical consequences 
mentioned above, which may turn out to be needlessly problematic. Trying (once again) 
not to delve into wider philosophical discussions any more than is absolutely necessary, it 
may hopefully suffice just to point out that to justify the thesis of the privacy of experience 
one is not obliged to endorse a subjective ontology of consciousness, as a weaker position 
positing only a subjective epistemology will be sufficient for this – while still enabling one 
to avoid those perplexing consequences (Northoff and Musholt 2006). According to 
epistemological subjectivism, the contents of consciousness are accessible or cognizable 
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only from the first-person-based point of view (i.e. only as experienced). This position 
does not automatically entail consciousness’s existing only as experienced (see Northoff 
and Musholt 2006). It therefore enables one to furnish a justificatory basis for explaining 
the mechanisms of consciousness – or even for their reduction to neurophysiology. Such a 
position also fits well with the multidimensional character of consciousness recently 
emphasized by some researchers (Bayne et al. 2016; Jonkisz et al. 2017), as a 
multidimensional consciousness may be both epistemologically subjective (in respect of 
content accessible from a first-person-based standpoint) and ontologically objective (in that 
it exists as a complex biological phenomenon). Moreover, epistemological subjectivity 
may itself be naturalized – in terms that make reference to individuating differences. (For 
the hypothesis of biological individuation, see Jonkisz (2015, 2016).) 
 
 
3.2 Methodological directness  
One specific sense for the notion of directness we are concerned with is defined in 
Reingold and Merikle (1988), an article that targets unconscious perception using 
discrimination tasks with objective performance thresholds. In that approach, direct 
measures are those that explicitly define a discriminative answer in the task description 
(e.g. a word, a letter, a color), whereas indirect measures measure the effect on some given 
discrimination that a certain perceiving of information not defined explicitly in the task, 
but nevertheless implicitly present, has. As in their example (familiar from the Stroop 
experiments), when presentations of color-word stimuli are followed by descriptions (e.g. 
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asking “Which word have you seen?”), the performances in such a task “constitute a direct 
measure of word perception,” while when the task is formulated in converse fashion by 
asking “What color have you seen?” it is judged that “any effect that the words may have 
on color-naming performance would constitute an indirect measure of word perception” 
(Reingold and Merikle 1988, 564). The authors stress that they are abstracting from any 
implications about the sort of underlying process that might influence performance (e.g. 
whether it is priming or subliminal perception). At the same time, they assume that under 
normal conditions direct measures should result in higher or equal performance rates (in 
respect of sensitivity) compared to indirect measures, whilst arguing that in other cases one 
may justifiably posit some sort of influence of unconscious processes on participants’ 
performance. As one can clearly see, directness defined in these, methodological terms is 
straightforwardly applicable to objective measures of performance. Hence, instances of the 
procedure should probably be referred to as direct performance measures rather than direct 
awareness measures – the more so as the relationship between performance and awareness 
is itself a matter of debate, as indeed is the validity of such measures (Timmermans and 
Cleeremans 2015). 
At the same time, a characterization of directness of this sort, as formulated by 
Reingold and Merikle, represents the only unambiguous sense attached to the term. As was 
already mentioned, this definition has not been explicitly applied within the current 
discussion concerning subjective measures, though it would be interesting to analyze the 
latter in the light of methodological directness. This may be done only very briefly here, as 
a preliminary step towards a proper investigation.  
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In the case of subjective experience measures such as PAS, what is explicitly 
defined in the task is the quality of (previous) stimulus experience (which has to be 
assessed). To be more literal in the application of the definition, if the task captured by the 
question “Which word have you seen?” constituted a direct measure of ‘word perception’ 
(as in the original scenario from Reingold and Merikle’s example), then the task captured 
by the question “What was the quality of your experience?” would constitute a direct 
measure of ‘quality perception.’ (In the PAS scenario analyzed here, it was ‘clarity’ that 
was in fact explicitly defined in the task as a qualitative feature of experience.) In this 
sense, subjective performance measures, such as CR and PDW, will measure experience 
quality only indirectly, since they do not to involve any experiential features being defined 
in the tasks (neither clarity, nor intensity or energy, etc.), being oriented instead towards 
the assessment of one’s own performance (by means of confidence or wagering). 
Consequently, it may be said that out of all of the subjective measures analyzed here only 
PAS represents a methodologically direct measure of certain qualitative features of 
experience (such as clarity).  
 
 
3.3 Semantic directness, and other senses of the term 
It is fairly common to see proposed the idea that so called ‘worldly discriminations’ 
correlate with lower-order contents than do reports of one’s own perceptual experiences; 
the former are therefore also called first-order states, the latter second-, higher-order or 
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metacognitive ones. (Other terms relevant to this distinction are, for instance, primary vs. 
secondary consciousness, and sensory consciousness vs. introspective consciousness (Seth 
2008a, Seth et al. 2005; Edelman 2003).) Such a hierarchy is sometimes expanded to 
encompass three, four, or even five consecutive orders (Jonkisz 2012; Morin 2006). With 
the aim in mind of seeking to analyze measures of consciousness, the following three 
orders of visual awareness will be discussed here: 
 Awareness of the stimulus (object experience) – enabling one to discriminate 
different features pertaining to the perception of the stimulus (e.g. its location, 
shape, color or category);  
 Awareness of seeing (seeing experience) – enabling one to discriminate different 
features of a visual experience (e.g. its clarity, intensity); 
 Awareness of (one’s) visual experiencing (experience of oneself as a seer) – 
enabling one to judge one’s own visual experience (e.g. in terms of object-
identification performance). 
The process is likely to be a great deal more complex, in fact, as even first-order 
awareness (object experience) may be split into awareness of some lower-level features 
pertaining to the stimulus (such as shape, location, hue, or color) and awareness of higher-
level features (like the identity of the object, or its semantic category). (In this context, see 
the level-of-processing hypothesis (Windey et al. 2013; Anzulewicz et al. 2015; Jimenez et 
al. 2020).) Moreover, taking the neurophysiology of visual perception as a basis, even the 
lower level features listed here may be ordered, since it is well known that information 
about shape and location is processed earlier than information about color (see Lamme et 
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al. 2000), as well as the various articles collected in Spillman and Werner 2012). Even so, 
the nature of the three coarse-grained orders described above is semantic rather than 
physiological. This is because the hierarchy reflects a referential ordering in which higher 
orders assume lower orders (in the sense of being about them; see Jonkisz et al. 2017, and 
Jonkisz 2012): without first-order sensory content (stimulus experience), it is impossible to 
perform a second-order assessment of, say, clarity of visual experience, and without any 
(second-order) awareness of the experience of seeing (e.g. its degree of clarity), it is 
practically impossible to be aware of one’s being engaged in visual perception oneself and, 
for example, assess one’s own discriminative performance. (In this context, see also Seth 
2008a.) 
Why might such orders of consciousness be relevant when analyzing possible 
senses in which measures could be said to be ‘direct’? When a participant reports no signs 
at all of higher-order awareness (e.g. ‘vague experience’ or ‘no experience’ in PAS, or 
‘guessing’ in CR), this is still not enough to declare a total absence of any sensorily 
experienced content. (As the suggestive dictum goes, “absence of evidence is not evidence 
of absence” (Seth 2008a; Timmermans and Cleeremans 2015).) Higher orders assume 
lower orders, but not vice versa. The lowest orders will therefore be in some sense basic or 
primary, and it may be hypothesized on this basis that: 
 A measure may be considered semantically more direct (than another) when it 
targets a lower-order awareness.  
26 
 
If that is the case, then the most semantically direct measures will be those that 
target one’s first-order awareness of the stimulus. Objective performance measures are the 
most obvious examples here, the original assumption behind such measures (i.e. so called 
‘World Discrimination Theory’ (Gaillard et al. 2006; Fu et al. 2008)) being that awareness 
of the stimulus correlates with behavioral sensitivity to the latter, disclosed in the form of 
an ability to discriminate its features with statistically significant accuracy. Meanwhile, 
Perceptual-Awareness Scale (PAS), despite its subjective threshold, also directly measures 
behavior (e.g. pressing the relevant buttons on a laptop keyboard). However, because a 
participant in a PAS experiment is asked to rate their own (first-order) visual experience 
(e.g. as clear, almost clear, vague, or nil), they have at the very least to be aware of seeing, 
so that the behavior correlates here with (at least) a second-order awareness of seeing. 
Although PAS does not seem to be semantically the most direct measure in this scenario, it 
is still likely to be more direct than other subjective measures. (At least, that was the initial 
claim put forward (Sandberg et al 2010).) 
According to the most common procedure applied in Confidence Ratings (CR) and 
Post-Decision Wagering (PDW), participants have to assess their own performance in 
some prior identification task by determining a degree of confidence, or an amount of 
money in a wager, on a structured scale (binary, four-fold or continuous), with their 
decision ultimately then being revealed in the corresponding behavior. (Behavioral 
responses may share an identical scenario across all subjective measures (Wierzchoń et al. 
2014).) It seems that judgements about one’s own performance require, even if only 
implicitly, at least a rudimentary consciousness of oneself as visually experiencing 
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something with a certain quality (i.e. clearly or not clearly enough). Hence, the task 
requirements of the CR and PDW procedures seem to result in highly metacognitive 
processes (Seth 2008a, 2008b) and require the most abstract orders-of-reference (Jonkisz et 
al. 2017). Ultimately, contra Persuad et al. (2007), such measures will be the least direct of 
all those appearing in the scenario.  
On the other hand, as some researchers have pointed out, to the extent that 
introspection is not explicitly called for in CR or PDW, one’s own performance 
judgements might then be based on more intuitive knowledge or instances of so called ‘gut 
feeling’ (see Timmermans and Cleeremans 2015, p. 34). If that were so, then subjective 
performance measures could in fact require lower-level contents – and possibly even ones 
lower than PAS (as originally claimed by Persuad et al. (2007) and more recently by Lyyra 
(2019)). Consequently, it can be said that in principle CR and PDW may be considered – 
and probably also designed as – semantically more or less direct. They will be more direct 
when participants judge their choices using ‘intuition’ or ‘gut feeling’ – with metacognitive 
judgements being in this case inhibited somehow (e.g. by limiting decision-times). And 
they will be less direct when participants are allowed, or even encouraged, to scrutinize 
their visual experience more carefully – with ‘intuitive judgements’ having somehow to be 
inhibited here (e.g. by removing limitations on decision times and/or asking that answers 
be subsequently confirmed). Hence, just as objective performance measures may be 
designed to be direct or indirect (see above, and also Reingold and Merikle (1988)), 
subjective performance measures (CR and PDW) may also be carried out in ways that will 
make them more or less so, at least in the semantic sense of ‘directness’. 
28 
 
 Are there any other senses in which talk of the ‘directness’ of such measures merits 
our interest here? One interesting possibility has been pointed out by an anonymous 
reviewer of this very article. It concerns the idea of ‘causal directness’. Intuitively, a 
measure of awareness will be causally direct if there is no intervening cause between the 
presence of consciousness and the behavior recorded. Consequently, measures with less 
intervening causes would count as causally more direct, and these are construable as 
measures with fewer and/or stronger causal connections obtaining between the presence of 
consciousness and the recorded behavior. The issue certainly calls for more careful 
investigation, but we can sketch out a few brief thoughts even at this stage. It may be said, 
to begin with, that all sorts of objective methods seem more direct in this sense, if only 
because the time interval between actual experience and related/measured behavior may 
well be shorter here (with basic sensory detections or discriminations occurring much more 
rapidly than metacognition). At the same time, in relation to other senses of ‘directness’, 
one can reasonably claim that semantically more direct measures also seem more causally 
direct (e.g. in the sense that measures of sensory content are more direct, both semantically 
and causally, than measures of higher-order and metacognitive contents), while 
methodologically indirect measures (e.g. priming methods) appear causally more direct 
than methodologically direct discriminations. It also seems that no measure could be 
absolutely causally direct, as this would represent a similarly idealized scenario to that of 
metaphysical directness. It would also appear to be the case that the idea of causal 
directness in some sense overlaps with that of metaphysical directness; however, this issue, 
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In the case of the distinction between subjective and objective measures, it has been shown 
that only its methodological version, based on criteria or thresholds for consciousness 
utilized in a given procedure, rules out both of the objections (i.e. the behavioral and 
phenomenological ones) outlined in the present article while also enabling one to 
distinguish between the measures unambiguously. However, it was argued that this is not 
the case for the semantic version, which distinguishes measures by their reference either to 
features of the stimuli presented (worldly discriminations) or to the participant’s 
introspective or inner states (experiential features). It was also demonstrated that such a 
formulation of the distinction raises at least three additional problems. The first difficulty 
was that it is virtually impossible to scrutinize introspection in a way that allows one to 
separate out experiential features from features of the stimulus itself. A second problem 
was that the distinction does not work properly in relation to either Confidence Ratings or 
Post-Decision Wagering, as they are explicit about not asking one to report either stimulus 
features or inner perceptual states. Meanwhile, the third issue concerned perception in 
general, in that whether a given measure directs the participant’s attention outwards or 
inwards fails to capture what is at stake; this is because subjective and objective aspects 
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may, in fact, be involved in both sensory content (accessing features of the stimulus) and 
introspective or metacognitive content.  
 Where the directness of these measures of awareness is concerned, the present 
article has shown that the philosophical assumptions of an ontological nature implicated in 
how this feature is sometimes understood needlessly entail certain troublesome 
metaphysical consequences. (A more conservative approach is therefore to be 
recommended in this matter – one in which subjectivity is interpreted epistemologically 
rather than ontologically). It has also been concluded that behavioral measures (obviously) 
cannot be metaphysically direct, since such a presumption would be fallacious (i.e. based 
on a category error). The present article has also explored the only unambiguous 
characterization of directness not yet ‘directly’ invoked in the current discussion. On this 
view, measures were considered direct when they explicitly specified a discriminative 
answer in the task description itself – otherwise they were considered indirect. Originally, 
this sort of methodological directness was applied to objective performance measures, but 
in this article a preliminary attempt at interpreting subjective measures in the light of this 
definition has also been undertaken. It was argued that only PAS represents a 
methodologically direct measure of experience quality (as it explicitly defines qualitative 
features of experience, such as clarity, in its delineation of its task), while both CR and 
PDW will only measure experience quality indirectly in this narrow sense (since they are 
directly oriented towards the assessment of one’s own performance). The article also 
sought to define (graded) semantic directness, according to which a given measure is 
considered semantically more direct if it targets a lower-order form of awareness. In the 
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latter sense, the most direct measures will be those that target first-order awareness of the 
stimulus: i.e. objective performance measures. PAS and other subjective experience 
measures will count as second- or higher-order awareness measures, whereas subjective 
performance measures (CR and PDW) will be regarded as third-order or metacognitive 
awareness measures (and hence as being the least direct of them all). Nevertheless, it was 
also pointed out that subjective performance measures could be considered more direct if, 
in the context of experimental procedures, metacognitive judgements were somehow to be 
inhibited to encourage more intuitive responses. In addition, the idea of causal directness 
was introduced – albeit also only in a preliminary form – where causally more direct 
measures are those with fewer and/or stronger connections between experience and 
recorded behavior. It was argued that objective measures seem causally more direct than 
subjective ones (if only because basic discriminations need shorter time intervals to affect 
behavior). Meanwhile, it also appears to be the case that the more a given measure is 
semantically direct, the more it is causally direct (for the same reason pertaining to time 
intervals) – though methodologically indirect priming shows up as causally more direct 
than forced-choice discriminations. Last but not least, as we have clearly seen, both 
semantic and causal directness are graded in character. 
We are now in a position to furnish more specific and justified answers to the target 
questions pursued here pertaining to subjectivity and directness as these relate to some 
given behavioral measure of awareness – namely, what makes a given measure subjective, 
and what makes it direct? 
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Where the former is concerned, it may be said that only a biased criterion for 
consciousness (subjective threshold) is what makes a behavioral measure unambiguously 
subjective (a bias-free criterion/objective threshold will automatically make a measure 
objective). In this sense, PAS, CR and PDW are equally subjective (despite the fact that 
participants directly assess their own perceptual experience only in PAS, whereas in CR 
and PDW they assess their own performances in respect of perceptual discrimination). It is 
worth adding here that the so called “meta-d’ procedures,” or certain versions of the 2-
interval forced-choice (2IFC) method developed recently by Maniscalco and Lau (2012, 
2014) and Peters and Lau (2015), aim at taking advantage of both subjective and objective 
measures (by trying to control subjective threshold biases with signal detection tools). The 
direction seems legitimate, yet the results and status of these methods remains a matter for 
further investigation (e.g. whether controlling the sensitivity of higher-order judgements 
about performance is enough to render a measure objective, or it is still, perhaps, a 
subjective measure of awareness, but an objective measure of metacognition). Anyway, the 
main conclusion is that the distinction between subjective and objective measures is 
unambiguous only when based on a methodological criterion. 
In the case of the latter (i.e. directness), this turns out to be quite ambiguous, with 
metaphysical, methodological, semantic and causal interpretations of the concept 
potentially in play. It was argued that behavioral measures cannot be metaphysically direct, 
and that such a conclusion is either tautological or based on a category error of sorts. 
Objective performance measures, on the other hand, can be methodologically direct (when 
the task explicitly specifies the discriminative answer in its description), but their validity 
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in measuring awareness is questionable. Meanwhile, subjective experience measures (such 
as PAS) may also be construed as methodologically direct, but what is being measured 
directly in this case is quality perception in respect of (previous) experiences (defined in 
terms of clarity or other experiential features). Behavioral measures may also be 
considered semantically more direct when they target lower-order forms of awareness. In 
the latter, graded sense of directness, objective performance measures will be the most 
direct, subjective experience measures (such as PAS) less direct, and subjective 
performance measures (such as CR and PDW) the least direct. The final sense of 
‘directedness’ introduced here concerned its causal interpretation, where causally more 
direct measures were characterized as being those with fewer and/or stronger connections 
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